This blog is part of the series “Ignored Conflicts” by the Peace & Conflict program at Polis180.

Until today, no government or international organisation has officially recognised the independence of Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia. Fearing to fuel other secessionist movements on the Continent, the African Union and other actors are hesitant to take any action. However, Somaliland functions with greater political stability and democratic governance than Somalia itself.

A blog by Luuk Simon

One Nation, or Two? The Political Puzzle

In the current world order based on the idea of nation-states, Somaliland is a paradox: the de facto state with separation of powers, working institutions, and regular elections since 2003 remains in diplomatic and legal limbo as no other state recognises it as being independent from Somalia. The Somali government in Mogadishu maintains – at least officially – the goal of national reunification within the borders of the Somali Republic, which was established in 1960. At the same time, Somaliland is actively pursuing international recognition as an independent and sovereign state by issuing its own passports, establishing de facto embassies in Taiwan and the US, as well as having signed international agreements with other governments.

Colonial heritage influencing today’s conflict

The conflict between Somalia and Somaliland originated in the region’s colonial past: what is now Somalia was once an Italian colony, while today’s Somaliland corresponds to the former British protectorate of Somaliland. Both gained their independence in 1960 and immediately merged into the Somali Republic, aiming at unifying all Somali people in one state. However, the northern region (today’s Somaliland) soon felt systematically marginalised by Mogadishu, and tensions culminated in brutal repression under the military regime of Siad Barre as the dictator favoured members of his family’s clan. As a result, the Somali National Movement (SNM) emerged during the 1980s, wanting to end the military regime in favour of a democratic system. Using excessive force, primarily against civilians in the northern region, the Barre regime tried to impose its rule. However, violence and destruction catalysed support for SNM, especially in the northern parts, traditionally inhabited by rival clans of Barre. SNM successfully ousted Barre in 1991, and Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia, making Hargeisa its capital.

Unrecognized Stability Meets Recognized Chaos

Somaliland has developed a working democratic government and is relatively stable today. Its economic situation is challenging due to the limited options to engage in international trade or attract foreign-directed investments. Not officially recognised, Hargeisa is excluded from international markets and primarily relies on livestock exports for its economy. However, Berbera Port, strategically located along the Gulf of Aden – one of the world’s most important trade routes – is a cornerstone of Somaliland’s economic aspirations. Backed by a million-dollar investment from the United Arab Emirates-based DP World, the port has undergone major upgrades, transforming it into a vital commercial and logistics hub that could rival regional ports in Djibouti and Eritrea.

Source: GinkoMaps

Meanwhile, Somalia cycles through political crises while trying to create a federal state. For years, debates about power distribution and the military command between the capital and the states have failed to deliver results and create a working state, exacerbated by clan rivalries, which have been fertile soil for terrorist groups like Al Shabaab. The Islamist terrorist group aims to replace the current government with an Islamic State. Using violent attacks against civilians to increase their influence, Al Shabaab now controls large parts of Somali territory, especially in the northern region of Puntland, bordering Somaliland, destabilising the region even more.

Two steps forward mean one step back

Potential initiatives for resolving the decades-long conflict often result in the opposite. Since 2012, a series of internationally facilitated talks – most notably mediated by Djibouti and the UK – have failed to bridge the gap between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. Somaliland demands recognition; Somalia offers autonomy at best. Recently, a newly signed Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland in 2024 about the usage of 20 km of coastline in exchange for considering recognising Somaliland’s independence and stakes in Ethiopian Airlines complicated diplomatic relations even more. The so-far good relations between Somalia and Ethiopia came to a halt until Türkiye managed to mediate between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu in early 2025 to restore diplomatic relations. However, this was bad news to Somaliland, as Ethiopia agreed with Somalia to solely engage with Hargeisa after having asked for permission in Mogadishu.

Securing the Shorelines: The Horn’s Role in Navigating Global Stability

Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa are of strategic relevance to global trade, as 33% of the world’s shipping passes the Gulf of Aden. Although Berbera Port in Somaliland is of growing strategic relevance for trade and foreign militaries, the country’s unrecognised independence complicates the involvement of international actors.

The recent re-election of Donald Trump in the United States could disrupt traditional diplomatic norms, and some Somaliland officials are hopeful that his administration’s more transactional approach to foreign policy might result in formal U.S. recognition of Somaliland — a possibility already hinted at in Trump’s ‘Project 2025’.For European policymakers, the time to engage meaningfully in the Horn of Africa is now. Ignoring this “frozen” conflict any longer risks thawing it under the heat of regional competition, terrorist resurgence, and economic disruption – consequences that would travel far beyond the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, fuelling migration which is already one of the EU’s major problems.

Luuk Simon joined Polis180 in March 2025. He studied International Relations in Karlsruhe and is currently pursuing an Advanced master’s in International Relations and Diplomacy in The Hague. Luuk’s primary research focus is on the transatlantic relationship as well as on conflict settlement.

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