This blog is part of the series “Ignored Conflicts” by the Peace & Conflict program at Polis180.
When we talk about ‘forgotten’ or ‘ignored’ conflicts, we must recognize the bias entailed in this phrasing. It is a Eurocentric view, that considers a conflict or war to be ignored, unless ‘the West’ pays sufficient attention to it. The civil war in Sudan has neither been ignored by local populations and civil society groups in Sudan striving for civilian and democratic governance, nor by external actors who capitalize on the conflict to advance their own interests and power. In the case of Sudan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Russia are particularly eager to increase their diplomatic and military influence and wealth – on the backs of the Sudanese people.
A blog by Merritt Fedzin

Source: Lana H. Haroun
The impact of Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule on today’s civil war
The current civil war must be assessed against the background of Sudan’s colonial history, which was marked by “marginalization, extraction and militarisation” under Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule and continues to do so to date.
The Anglo-Egyptian rule fostered divisions between ethnic groups in Sudan – particularly between the predominantly Arabic-speaking and Muslim population in the North and the multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multilingual population in the South. The British invested economic and political capital exclusively into the North of Sudan – thereby dividing the country culturally and socially while leaving it under one political rule. This “divide-and-rule” strategy effectively steered Sudan into its three civil wars. After gaining independence in 1955, the Northerners sought to assimilate the Southerners by force, rendering a Southern resistance movement against the Northerners inevitable. The demand for militarisation was therefore high, and several regional actors were and are still today actively supplying fighting factions with arms, in order to extract oil and gold – the two key export goods of the Sudanese economy. The colonial history has therefore caused fighting over resources and ethnic divisions, leading not only to the separation of South Sudan and Sudan in 2011 but also heavily impacting the latest war since 2023.
The war in Sudan: “a counterrevolutionary undoing of the gains of the Sudanese people”
Protests across Sudan over economic hardship, breakdowns in the educational and transport system but also in general criticism of the regime erupted in December 2018 and led to the ouster of its president Omar al-Bashir (1989-2019) by the army. Al-Bashir, who is the first acting head of state to be indicted by the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, governed Sudan under repressive rule for 30 years, targeting in particular religious and ethnic minorities. After the coup, Sudan entered a phase of a civilian-military government led by the Transitional Sovereignty Council. But protests demanding democratic transition continued and led to the interim government being overthrown in another coup in October 2021, and the Council of Generals took over power; including General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, as head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and General Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo, the latter’s deputy and leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF was originally founded by the Sudanese government itself in 2013, in order to target rebel movements in the Western Sudanese region of Darfur. It was assembled out of “Janjaweed” Rizeigat militias who committed acts of ethnic cleansing in Darfur in 2003.
Attempts to redirect power into civilian rule through a framework deal failed. With the two generals in competition for power and under threat of losing their position to a civilian government, tensions between the two forces rose, escalating into open conflict on 15 April 2023.

After more than 20 months of fighting in Sudan, the war has become one of attrition, in which the warring parties’ fighting capabilities have been largely upheld by external actors, but neither has been ascribed the ability to win. This civil war over the rulership of Sudan is also shaped by a resource and ethnic dimension.
From Moscow to Abu Dhabi to Cairo – how external actors are influencing dynamics in Sudan
Different actors across and beyond the region have been influencing the conflict dynamics through their military support to increase their geopolitical clout, but also by upholding the war economy and incentivising fighting factions to gain access to resources and lands.

For example, since December 2023, the RSF has been cleansing farmers’ villages in Gezira and converting them into militarised ranches, in order to capitalise on the “burgeoning livestock trade with the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, which has now been re-established as Sudan’s leading export industry”. While Riyadh is particularly interested in securing food security and containing the UAE’s access to the Red Sea, Abu Dhabi also focuses on gold and minerals. Saudi Arabia has found itself in a balanced position between the UAE on the RSF’s side and Egypt, which is supporting the SAF in its traditional alliance with Khartoum against Ethiopia.
In order to secure its interests, the UAE has reportedly used Hemedti as a custodian to guard gold mines which have been controlled by the Wagner Group. Extracted resources were then transferred via the UAE to Russia, who has become dependent on gold and other finances amid the introduction of European sanctions. Since Russian cooperation with the RSF through the Wagner Group has ceased in 2023, Russia’s interest in pursuing closer ties with the Sudanese government has been highlighted by recent discussions between officials on joint oil and gas exploration and production and other forms of energy cooperation. Days after the talks were held, Russia vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and the protection of civilians in Sudan, and did so with the support of Sudan’s de facto leader Al-Burhan.
While these events represent only a small portion of the entanglement by external actors in Sudanese politics, they highlight how foreign governments give primacy to their own interests, even if claiming to be committed to conflict resolution efforts at the preface. Since the war began, the Council of the EU has introduced sanctions on both RSF and SAF members, and provided humanitarian and ‘development’ funding worth €896 million to Sudan. At the same time, it has signed a €7.4 billion “cash for migrant control deal” with Egypt in 2024, after more than 1.2 million refugees have fled to Egypt. The difference between the funding amounts directed towards Sudan reflects how priorities by external actors lie not on the resolution of the conflict but instead on mitigating its consequences on the one hand and profiting from it on the other.
Any resolution in sight?
Saudi Arabia and the U.S. as key mediators started hosting the Jeddah talks in various rounds immediately after fighting erupted in 2023. The U.S.’ interests in Sudan are based on containment of Russian and Chinese influence in Africa more generally, but also directed at preventing the formation of unwanted alliances beyond its control. For example, de-facto leader Al-Burhan signed the Abraham Accords to normalise relations with Israel, which – as a traditional U.S. ally – also holds high stakes in the Sudanese war. The Jeddah talks included the SAF and RSF only and exclusively focussed on achieving a ceasefire and humanitarian efforts, not allowing for political negotiations. This framework excluded civilian actors and armed groups, who have been shaping Sudan’s political landscape for decades. In order to get a stake in any future political agreement in Sudan, these groups were forced to abandon their neutrality and side with either the SAF or RSF. It can be argued that the Jeddah talks therefore have in fact deepened the country’s divisions, and granted political legitimacy to the military factions by limiting the negotiations to the two parties only and by failing to address the root causes of the conflict, going beyond the power struggles between the SAF and RSF.
Most recently, Türkiye offered itself as mediator in Sudan’s civil war, which is in line with its growing foreign policy ambitions to promote itself as a trustable partner across Africa, as it did for example recently through successfully brokering a deal between Ethiopia and Somalia. In a novel approach, it suggested mediating not between the SAF and RSF but instead between the SAF and the UAE. The latter has been accused to be an essential supporter of the RSF in the war, as reports by the UN suggest, and without which the RSF would have been unlikely to uphold its fighting capabilities over such a long period. Türkiye’s call for mediation has been welcomed by the UAE with openness and willingness to end the conflict in Sudan, but without acknowledging its own involvement directly. On the other side of the table, the SAF and Sudanese government have cautiously welcomed the Turkish efforts, given its balanced relationship with both parties and the preference over U.S.-Saudi mediation. Considering the Saudi rivalry with the UAE over geopolitical, economic and military influence in the region and the US’ recent issuing of sanctions, it seems evident that Ankara appears as a more suitable mediator.
Further, in an attempt to challenge the legitimacy of the military junta, a Sudanese anti-war coalition has been holding talks on establishing a government-in-exile, which may present an opportunity for European governments to leverage their resources and expertise in support of civilian-led conflict resolution efforts. Without a significant shift in fighting capabilities, and therefore also inherently in foreign support to the warring parties, the war is unlikely to end anytime soon. Further massacres, like those committed by the RSF against non-Arab communities in the city of El Fasher in Darfur, must be prevented. The ignorance displayed by states across the globe in light of genocide occuring is another sad testimonial of how human security stands last on the list of foreign interests. Possible resolution efforts should focus on depriving the warring parties and external actors of their economic incentives for resource and land grabbing, in order to avoid worsening of one of the world’s largest displacement and hunger crises.
Merritt Fedzin joined Polis180 in 2021 and is a member of the board since July 2024, where she is responsible for the publications and international affairs departments. Merritt studied European Studies, International Security and Conflict Studies in Magdeburg, Berlin and Istanbul. In her research she focusses in particular on security and conflict dynamics from Central to Western Asia and Africa.
The Polis Blog serves as a platform at the disposal of ‘Polis180’s & ‘OpenTTN‘s members. Published comments express solely the ‘authors’ opinions and shall not be confounded with the opinions of the editors or of Polis180.
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