This blog is part of the series “David against Goliath: Lessons of Resistance from Eastern Europe and Central Asia” by the Perspektive Ost program at Polis180.
Over 200 days of protests in Serbia and Georgia show determination, but key demands remain unmet. Should movements contest elections or keep challenging authoritarian regimes from the streets?
A blog post by Marina Milic
In recent years, protests triggered by localized injustices or by broader political grievances have become a recurring form of resistance across the globe. In illiberal or hybrid regimes, where a democratic façade serves to legitimize power both internationally and domestically, protests triggered by specific events tend to follow a familiar pattern: a triggering event, a rupture, an emotional outburst – and, more often than not, no significant change to the political status quo. As personally empowering and transformative as they may be, such mobilisation often fail to leave a lasting political impact in the context of hybrid regimes, which are undergoing a process of authoritarian learning – by controlling media narratives, delegitimizing activists or absorbing public outrage without conceding meaningful reforms. This pattern can be observed in cases such as the “1 of 5 million” protests in Serbia (2018–2020), demonstrations in Russia following Alexei Navalny’s arrest (2021), mass mobilizations in Georgia against the “foreign agents” law (2023–2024) and the post-election uprising in Belarus (2020), – all of which, despite their scale and persistence, failed to produce lasting political consequences. In such environments, hard repression is frequently replaced by more subtle strategies to suppress dissent – legal harassment, arrests, and the slow erosion of collective energy. Fatigue becomes a strategy, not a side effect.
Yet the protest movements in Serbia and Georgia are challenging this script. For more than eight months, citizens in both countries have managed to uphold what scholars of social movements call WUNC – worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment – despite growing repression – or because of it. While these protests may have begun as spontaneous outbursts, they have since evolved into sustained efforts to build coalitions, articulate demands, and challenge entrenched power. Nonetheless, fear and exhaustion remain constant companions on this long road. In countries where protest can cost you your job, your safety, your freedom or your today or tomorrow, fear does not mean defeat – it is the terrain activists must learn to navigate together. This is precisely why the act of protesting must continuously reinvent itself through new forms, new strategies, and new alliances. Given they are still on the streets, the question is no longer just how to endure but how to evolve, how to adapt and create lasting conditions that will lead to the political change they are hoping for.
Despite months of sustained protest action and a widespread sense of political awakening, protest movements in neither Serbia nor Georgia have yet achieved tangible political outcomes. This has led to a re-evaluation of tactics – especially regarding the question of whether to shift from non-institutional resistance to institutional engagement. It is at this juncture that the paths of Serbia and Georgia begin to diverge.
(Non-)Institutionalization: Serbia vs Georgia
Initially framing their cause as anti-systemic rather than anti-government, the student protest movement in Serbia gradually came to recognise the limits of this position. After months of mobilization sparked by the deadly collapse of a newly renovated canopy at the Novi Sad train station and the government’s refusal to investigate or take political responsibility, the movement realized that avoiding political engagement was no longer feasible and that street protests alone were insufficient for their demands to be fulfilled. In May 2025, they made a significant strategic shift: demanding for early parliamentary elections and announcing the formation of a unified student electoral list.
Despite being fully aware of the unfair and unfree electoral conditions, the students supported an institutional approach to resolving the political crisis, with their main demand becoming the calling for early parliamentary elections – not as a sign of compromise, but as a form of confrontation from within. This step was motivated by the belief that their protest had already triggered a broad political awakening across the country. Entering the elections became a way to maximize their unique assets: the credibility of youth-led activism, a clear distance from political corruption, and a mobilized support base. Local elections in the towns of Zaječar and Kosjerić became proving grounds, where students helped coordinate campaigns, monitor polling stations, and engage voters – treating institutional engagement itself as an extension of civic resistance.
In Georgia, the protests initially erupted in October 2024 after Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced the suspension of EU accession negotiations until at least 2028, sparking mass outrage and sustained mobilization over the country’s halted European integration. In contrast to Serbia, no single student-led movement has emerged. Instead, protest leadership has been far more decentralized and ideologically diverse, encompassing a broad spectrum of pro-European opposition actors, civic groups, and activists. Despite these differences, a shared position remains: no participation in elections until concrete conditions are met. They believe that under current circumstances participating in elections would mean further legitimizing an increasingly authoritarian system, one that has already imprisoned six leading opposition figures and designated around 60 individuals as prisoners of conscience, all while the repressive “foreign agents law” was adopted and entered into force. Taking part in the elections would, in the eyes of many protesters and activists, amount to capitulation to an authoritarian regime.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that, despite the prevailing consensus in favor of a boycott, some voices within the opposition and civil society argue that every available avenue should be used to challenge the regime – even flawed elections – warning that total disengagement could risk ceding the political field entirely to the ruling party.
Between Principle and Pragmatism: What Comes Next?
Two different strategies reflect the distinct political contexts in which Serbia and Georgia operate, confirming that the level of civic mobilization, its political articulation, and institutional participation are closely shaped by the regimes’ strategies of repression, (de-)legitimation, and co-optation. In this sense, the choice between institutional engagement and non-engagement is not merely tactical. It reveals the degree of systemic political closure and the risks and consequences of entering a political arena that, in hybrid regimes, is structurally tilted in favour of the ruling power.
In Serbia, the active involvement of the opposition, supported logistically and symbolically by the student movement, yielded visible effects. A unified opposition list in the town of Kosjerić, bolstered by a grassroots, door-to-door campaign and the moral credibility of non-partisan youth activists, managed to seriously shake the ruling party, narrowing their victory margin to just 0.69% of the votes. Despite unfair electoral conditions, this outcome demonstrated that institutional engagement from below can serve both as a mobilizing force for citizens and a blow to the regime’s self-confidence. As it increasingly loses its grip on power, the true face of the regime – its brutality and authoritarian character – has begun to reveal itself more openly in recent days. Since the massive protest in Belgrade on 28 June, there has been a noticeable escalation in police violence and repression. Compared to earlier phases of the protest, where the regime largely relied on surveillance, media manipulation, and selective pressure, the response in recent days has become noticeably more repressive. Police brutality, arbitrary arrests, and intimidation tactics have intensified, revealing a shift from controlled deterrence to open coercion.
By contrast, Georgia’s political environment offers even less room to maneuver. The escalating repression – including arrests of opposition leaders, police brutality and the erosion of institutional checks – began much earlier and with greater intensity. This reinforced the belief that participating in elections under such conditions would only serve to legitimize an authoritarian system, both domestically and internationally. While no clear leading figure has yet emerged, opposition forces and civil society actors – including former President Salome Zurabishvili, who has been active at rallies alongside students and other opposition leaders – have rallied around the newly proposed Resistance Platform as an initial attempt to build unity in the protest movement. This platform focuses on sustained public pressure, international advocacy, and a boycott strategy aimed at delegitimizing the current regime.
Ultimately, the cases of Serbia and Georgia illustrate two distinct trajectories of grassroots mobilization and political articulation – each shaped by the dynamic interplay between bottom-up civic energy and top-down strategies of control and repression. Institutional participation can open opportunities for influence but carries the risk of co-optation and loss of credibility. Boycott can preserve moral clarity, but may lead to political marginalization. The key challenge remains: how to translate civic energy into lasting democratic change – without compromising autonomy, losing momentum, or abandoning the belief that change is still possible.
Marina Milic is the co-lead of the “Perspektive Ost” programme at Polis180 . She completed her master’s degree in Democracy and Democratization at the Faculty of Political Sciences. Her fields of interest include protest movements, authoritarian regimes, and EU enlargement.
The Polis Blog serves as a platform at the disposal of ‘Polis180’s & ‘OpenTTN‘s members. Published comments express solely the ‘authors’ opinions and shall not be confounded with the opinions of the editors or of Polis180.
Zurück