This blog is part of the series “David against Goliath: Lessons of Resistance from Eastern Europe and Central Asia” by the Perspektive Ost program at Polis180.
The results of Romania’s 2024 first presidential round were not only a shock to the more reliable polling institutes inside the country, but were likewise a surprise for politicians, journalists and observers in the country and abroad. Most googled word on November 24: Călin Georgescu.
A blog by Celine Cojocar
Politicians were scrambling for answers, looking for scapegoats and made an already chaotic situation significantly worse by taking the decision to annul the elections in the midst of the second round, after thousands of Romanians in the Diaspora had already cast their vote. This decision would downgrade Romania from a flawed democracy to a hybrid regime in the Economist’s 2024 Democracy Index. According to this report and the opinion of millions of Romanian citizens, the elections were cancelled in “murky circumstances”, with many pointing fingers at attempts to change rules regarding Diaspora voting – a key issue in Romanian elections for more than a decade.
While reactions to the political chaos came swiftly, explanations remained fragmented, far from forming a coherent narrative of how an unfamiliar figure suddenly emerged as the country’s most popular presidential contender. And while investigative journalists are revealing more and more details of what is going on behind the scenes of the electoral campaigns, a full picture of the situation is still not visible. From the spread of mis- and disinformation on Tik Tok, over missteps by the governing parties, to a lack of digital literacy and a general frustration in the country over inflation and other socio-economic issues, there are many reasons brought forward, explaining the sudden rise of the far-right candidate. However, one factor that is often discussed but rarely fully understood is the growing discontent within the Romanian Diaspora and its shift towards the far-right political spectrum.
This is not only a story about foreign interference and online disinformation. It is also a story about millions of Romanians living abroad, long marginalised in national discourse, who are becoming more and more outspoken in demanding political change.
The Social Issue
Romania’s EU accession has significantly increased the country’s reliance on labour migration for remittances. Those who have not moved, have family members that moved. Some of them never return. Over the years, they have become the Romanian Diaspora. Official numbers estimate them at around 5,7 million people, while Romania’s domestic population stands at nearly 22 million.
Many families depend on the income of relatives working abroad, yet the high mobility of these workers, who often move between countries multiple times a year, has created challenges to both social stability and long-term economic planning. Thus, the Diaspora has developed long-standing frustrations with their circumstances – frustrations that have largely gone unaddressed. This sense of forced mobility, driven by economic necessity rather than choice, has left many feeling abandoned by a system that fails to offer viable opportunities at home. This was already visible when the Diaspora started voting for the newly founded populist far-right Alliance for the Union of Romania (AUR) party in 2020, the year of the pandemic.
This sentiment of being abandoned was exacerbated during the pandemic. Romanians who have felt like second-hand citizens for years, working as entrepreneurs, doctors, or construction workers, experienced a situation, in which no country wanted to claim them as their own. The stories of seasonal workers who died after contracting COVID-19 on German farms, despite strict health rules that seemed to apply to everyone but them, is a reminder that these impressions are based in a reality. One man was found dead in the container in which he was staying. The harvest continued.
At the same time, the then president of Romania spoke directly to the Diaspora, asking them to not come back to the country, saying that the health system is already put to the test, alienating them even further. The already existing divide between those who stayed in Romania and those that left for better opportunities deepened.
While there is no shortage of challenges for Romanians in and outside the country, be it economic, political or social, the Diaspora has oftentimes been overlooked in national discourse.
That same year, in 2020, over 20% of Romanians abroad voted for the far-right populist party AUR (compared to 9% in Romania). Freshly founded, it directly targeted the Diaspora, creating a narrative around pride and patriotism for their country. Research shows that this influenced citizens at home, too. The villages and regions that have been hit the hardest by emigration throughout the years also voted disproportionately high for this far-right populist party, suggesting that migrants‘ choices reverberated through transnational social networks.
The Technological Issue
The pandemic, which seems to have been deleted from our collective memory, also resulted in something else: social and physical isolation. This is incredibly difficult for any person, but especially difficult for those, who cannot rely on in-person social networks to overcome difficult periods.
For many in the Romanian Diaspora, already scattered across Europe and beyond, online spaces became the only way to stay connected with loved ones back home. It was during this time that the far-right party AUR began to gain traction – long before Călin Georgescu entered the political stage. They rose to popularity thanks to social media networks, particularly Facebook, in a time when these social networks were the only way for the Diaspora to connect with their loved ones at home. This isolation, mixed with experiences of discrimination, labour exploitation and high instability, in addition to anxiety fuelled by the 24-hours news cycle during the pandemic, led the Diaspora to be particularly susceptible for populist messages, which addressed their real-life needs and grievances – something that the established parties could or did not want to do.
A recent civil society report on the annulled 2024 elections confirmed what many already predicted: recommendation algorithms have fuelled polarisation and eroded trust, especially in diaspora communities. Disinformation exploited historical trauma and religious sentiment to radicalise and divide. The report calls for a targeted strategy to counter the double exposure of the diaspora, bombarded by disinformation both from Romanian actors and from within their host countries.
Calling for a Different Approach towards the Diaspora
Now, in pointing towards this divide between Romanians abroad and at home, there is a risk of reinforcing existing social tensions. The election of Călin Georgescu in the first round has led to an explosion of this discourse: us vs. them. Standing on the University Square in Bucharest, at one of the pro-European demonstrations in December 2024, various pleas, such as “Don’t do this to us, you left us and now we must suffer under your choices”, were among the messages directed at the Diaspora, capturing the resentment and emotional strain felt by many.
While frustrations are understandable, the events are symptomatic of a larger issue: the disintegration of Romanian society and the lack of understanding about the challenges faced by Romanians abroad. For years, they have contributed to the country through remittances, informal diplomacy, and by maintaining cultural and emotional ties. Yet, they remain politically marginalised. However, much of the Diaspora does not see itself as permanently removed from Romania. Many want to return. They want to raise families, build businesses, and contribute to a country they still consider home. But they are hesitant to return to a system where institutions are unresponsive, trust in democratic institutions is fragile, and political discourse frames them as outsiders.
Addressing this requires more than electoral reform. It demands a comprehensive, long-term strategy that creates opportunities for Diaspora reintegration and invests in a political culture that recognizes Romanians abroad not as a liability, but as active partners in shaping the national development.
Celine Cojocar has joined Polis180 in 2022, actively contributing to the Perspektive Ost Programme. She graduated with a Master in European Affairs from Sciences Po Paris and her research focuses on issues relevant to Eastern Europe, particularly Romania, including Diaspora policies, disinformation and artificial intelligence, migration issues as well as minority rights. Moreover, she is the co-founder of a film festival about the wars and post-conflict reconstruction in Ukraine, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
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