In the context of the re-election of Donald Trump as US president and the recent elections in Germany, it is necessary to explore the preparedness of Germany, its neighbours and Europe as a whole to deal with a US that is pivoting towards Asia and away from a shared Western security architecture. With this blogpost, the OpenTTN aims to showcase how Europe and in particular Germany and Austria are reacting, whether they are prepared to take more responsibility for their security and which underlying political and societal forces are at play. For this, the authors – two young European foreign policy professionals – had the chance to discuss with Ben Hodges, retired Commander of the United States Army Europe to whom they would like to extend their sincere thanks.
A blog by Elke Schraik (Ponto) and Jona Grimm (Polis180)
Identity struggles and paradoxes – the case of Austria
Elke Schraik – Ponto, Austria
In Austria, there are on the one hand voices from academia highlighting that – since the US is in retreat – Austria, but also the EU in general, have to step up in defensive matters in general and concerning Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine in particular. If we do not support Ukraine more, this may signal to Russia that breaches of international law go unpunished. On the other hand, the mood in society constitutes an important challenge, since it strongly affects politics: neutrality is a vital part of Austrian identity and the majority of Austrian citizens consider it an important instrument of security policy. Although this does not correspond to reality, this is what many Austrians believe and there is a false sense of security due to a lack of interest in and thus information about foreign and security policy. Thus, an increase in resources and activity in the defense sector is not popular with the electorate. Given Austrians have not been confronted with foreign and security questions for a long time, public debates on the topic are scarce, and have only started gaining momentum recently. This also means that for political parties, questions of foreign policy are not very relevant for winning elections, while touching upon the topic of neutrality and putting it into question has been considered counter-productive in election campaigns. A recent survey carried out by the University of Innsbruck clearly shows the lack of willingness of Austrians to defend their country with arms, let alone other countries. Only 14 % would support another EU member state in case of an aggression with armed troops, but 85 % expect other member states to support Austria in such a case. Nevertheless, since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there has been at least a discourse on neutrality and the defence budget has been increased by 1 billion in the last two years, standing now at approximately 0.7 % of Austria’s GDP. Therefore, while some improvements are visible, it will take some time and effort for the public to develop a stronger sense of urgency.
German strategy and leadership? Roadblocks remain.
Jona Grimm – Polis180, Germany
While Trump’s electoral chances have this time been taken more seriously than in 2016, there have been few (visible) preparations in the German policy sphere to deal with a Republican victory. Furthermore, the commonly voiced conjecture of many observers – that Germany’s former traffic light coalition might set internal differences aside after a possible Trumpist victory – proved wrong when the coalition broke apart the evening after the election. One significant problem of the coalition had been that many projects in the agreed coalition treaty from 2021 became fiscally unfeasible, due to – among other reasons – the Russian invasion of Ukraine. After the latest federal elections in February 2025, this roadblock has been partly removed, at least regarding security expenditures, which are now partially exempt from the debt brake. While this could in theory be seen as a guarantee for sufficient investments into German security and defence, there is reason to be sceptical, particularly in regard to the medium-term. Increased defense expenditure without other fiscal consolidation will lead to increasingly higher debt and thus an increasing proportion of government revenue that needs to be used to pay the debt’s interest. While this will not impede Germany’s security expenditure in the short-term, it is a strong incentive to lower it on a longer-time horizon in the order of 10 years if no other fiscal consolidation is achieved. This, however, would require a (fiscal) reprioritization by politicians and the population, which seems to not be a given at this moment, even though Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has increased its position as a threat in the eyes of the German population. Additionally, the current two major populist parties, AfD and BSW, also strongly campaign for a dovish position on Russia and thus further hamper the adaptation to today’s security realities.
Even though there may be somewhat more willingness for prioritizing security in the political sphere, its debates often focus on concrete questions like specific measures for Ukraine, rather than developing a comprehensive security strategy. In the case of only more expensive and less reliable US security guarantees for Europe, this approach of small and concrete steps may be sufficient to muddle through the current and upcoming challenges. In the case of more tectonic shifts, like a US-withdrawal from NATO, it is however highly questionable whether Germany could take leadership in a way how its European partners expect it to.
Recommendations
- Establishment of a coherent and long-term fiscal policy to finance defense and security
- Overcome the lack of citizens’ support concerning
- an increase of the defence budget
- a higher priority of security policies through information campaigns
- Development of German leadership within the EU in the area of defense and security
Elke Schraik is a board member at Ponto and OpenTTN. After completing her doctoral thesis on the EU as a global digital actor, comparing its external digital policies towards the US and the African continent, she works as a lecturer at the University of Vienna, the Diplomatic Academy Vienna, and the University of Applied Sciences for European Business and Management.
Jona Grimm is on the executive board of Polis180 and works at the intersection of business, technology and geopolitics. After completing his thesis on quantum computing and quantum machine learning and working as a programme coordinator at the German Foreign Office, he is now a geopolitical analyst at a supranational organisation.
The Polis Blog serves as a platform at the disposal of ‘Polis180’s & ‘OpenTTN‘s members. Published comments express solely the ‘authors’ opinions and shall not be confounded with the opinions of the editors or of Polis180.
Zurück