This blog is part of the series “Ignored Conflicts” by the Peace & Conflict program at Polis180.
In October 2023, when the Houthis launched missile strikes on Israel, Yemen briefly made headlines. Yet, the ongoing humanitarian disaster – 12 million children in urgent need of aid and over 20 million relying on international assistance – continues to be overlooked. This report dives into the complex web of actors driving Yemen’s protracted conflict, from foreign interventions to fractured governance and rising extremism.
In October 2023, Ansarullah, commonly referred to as the “Houthis”, a Zaidi Shia movement centred around the al-Houthi family driven by grievances over marginalization and opposition to foreign intervention, launched missile strikes against Israel in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. For a brief moment, global attention shifted to Yemen, despite having endured a humanitarian crisis for years.
This neglect of the humanitarian situation in Yemen has devastating consequences. After nine years of civil war, 12 million children urgently need food, water, shelter, and medicine. An estimated 4.5 million people – 14 percent of the population – are displaced, many multiple times. Two-thirds of Yemenis, or 21.6 million people, require humanitarian assistance. Despite its oil reserves and agricultural potential, famine looms due to the absence of effective governance and relentless fighting among factions backed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran.
Recent global concern, however, did not centre on Yemen’s suffering but on threats to global shipping lanes. Western powers, including the US and UK, bombed Houthi military sites to protect their economic interests. Once the danger was contained, Yemen faded from the global agenda again. This neglect is compounded by the complexity of the conflict, characterized by numerous armed factions, and the absence of any clear “good guys” for international actors to support. Western leaders, wary of alienating strategic allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, see little political incentive to engage.
This indifference is both morally and strategically misguided. Beyond the humanitarian catastrophe, Yemen’s descent into lawlessness has made it a hub for extremist groups like Islamic State in Yemen and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The conflict, rooted in colonial legacies and regional power struggles, demands accountability and international engagement. Ignoring Yemen not only perpetuates immense human suffering but also undermines global stability.
The tale of the two Yemens
Yemen’s modern history traces back to British colonialism, when the British Empire seized the strategic port city of Aden in 1839, transforming it into a critical hub for trade routes to India. This move intensified tensions with the Ottoman Empire, which controlled northern Yemen, resulting in a divided territory – a legacy that continues to shape the nation’s conflicts. The British-backed Aden Protectorate in the south and Ottoman-controlled North Yemen became politically and culturally distinct regions.
After the Ottoman Empire’s collapse following World War I, North Yemen established the Mutawakkilite Kingdom, which transitioned into the Yemen Arab Republic in 1962 after a nationalist revolution aligned with broader Arab nationalist movements. Meanwhile, South Yemen remained under British rule until 1967, when a Marxist revolution led to its independence as the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, backed by the Soviet Union. As a Cold War flashpoint, the south adopted a strict socialist model, aligning with Soviet allies like Cuba. The ideological and socio-political differences between the two regions were stark: the north adhered to traditional tribal and religious values, heavily influenced by Zaydi Shia Islam, while the south promoted secular governance, modern education, and significant advancements in women’s rights.
However, South Yemen’s socialist and isolationist economic policies stifled trade and exacerbated its economic struggles. By the late 1980s, facing economic hardship and the decline of the Soviet Union, South Yemen found unification with the north in 1990 a pragmatic necessity rather than a political desire. Yet tensions persisted, culminating in a brief civil war in 1994, with the North emerging dominant under President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who then consolidated power over South Yemen. The former division bred long-standing resentments, with Southerners often feeling marginalized by the Northern-dominated government.
Saleh’s authoritarian rule and widespread corruption fueled growing discontent, culminating in the 2011 Arab Spring protests. Saleh’s forced resignation in 2011 ushered in a transitional government led by Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, whose tenure was marked by corruption and ineffective governance. Hadi’s administration failed to address key grievances, particularly those of the southern forces and the Houthi tribes in the North, a Zaydi Shia minority allied with Iran and marginalized under Saleh. Exploiting the dissatisfaction, the Houthi forces counter-intuitively temporarily allied with Saleh, and seized Yemen’s capital Sana’a in 2014, forcing Hadi to flee to Aden in 2015, the former capital of Southern Yemen, while remaining in power. The capture of Sana’a by the Houthis prompted a Saudi-led military intervention in 2015, including among others the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Egypt. Although the intervention officially ended a few months later, ground troops remained in the country as part of a broader offensive against the Houthis. This escalation deepened Yemen’s protracted and devastating civil war, leading to state fragmentation and a worsening humanitarian crisis. All parties involved, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have since been accused of violating international humanitarian and human rights law, yet they have largely evaded accountability.
Inside Yemen’s Conflict: A Look at the Main Players
In April 2022, President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi resigned, which led to the collapse of the internationally recognized government. This power vacuum subsequently paved the way for the formation of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in 2022, designed as a more inclusive framework to unify various factions opposing the Houthis. However, to this day, the PLC struggles with internal divisions, limiting its ability to act.
The former Hadi government faction
The former Hadi government faction, now part of the PLC, seeks to restore a unified Yemeni government, focusing on reclaiming control of northern Yemen and countering Houthi influence. They aim to preserve Yemen’s territorial integrity and regain the legitimacy of the internationally recognized government. While they benefit from Saudi support, the former Hadi government’s forces are fragmented. Internal divisions and a lack of coordination make the faction less effective compared to other well-organized forces on the ground.
The Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the UAE
A key actor within the PLC is the STC, which advocates for full independence of southern Yemen. The STC emerged as the dominant force within the al-Hirak movement, though its leadership is not consistently accepted by all al-Hirak members. “Al-Hirak”, is a secessionist movement that emerged in 2007, demanding autonomy and claiming that the 1994 war had effectively nullified unification, making the South an occupied territory.
Created in 2017, the STC has grown with substantial support from the UAE, which provides both military and financial assistance. The STC’s military dominance is largely attributed to the UAE-backed Security Belt Forces, which function as the group’s armed wing. The STC’s primary objective is to gain international legitimacy for its secessionist cause, which is in direct contrast to the PLC’s unity-focused goals. Despite its political efforts, the STC has faced criticism for human rights abuses, including the operation of secret prisons in southern Yemen, where detainees have reportedly been tortured. Moreover, the STC has imposed restrictions on political activities in territories it controls, further consolidating its power.
The STC’s secessionist agenda aligns with the UAE’s geopolitical interests in southern Yemen. The UAE is determined to maintain a strategic presence in the region, primarily to control southern Yemen’s vital ports and coastal areas, which are crucial for the UAE’s maritime oil trade. A government loyal to the UAE in southern Yemen would allow the UAE to safeguard its economic and security interests. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has sought to counterbalance the STC’s influence, aiming to restore a unified Yemeni government that would serve as a bulwark against Iran’s regional influence. Saudi Arabia attempts to limit the STC’s control by establishing military positions in 2024 in southeastern Yemen.
The Islah Party
The STC’s strained relationship with other PLC factions, particularly the Islah party, exacerbates internal divisions. Islah, Yemen’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, has long been a key ally of the former Hadi government in the fight against the Houthi forces and has advocated for stronger ties with Saudi Arabia. However, Islah’s Islamist ideology has led to tensions with the UAE, which views the Muslim Brotherhood as a regional threat and a breeding chamber for terrorism. The STC and al-Hirak blame Islah for exacerbating conflicts in the South during the 1994 civil war. Despite these internal frictions, Islah remains an essential component of the anti-Houthi coalition, supported by Saudi Arabia as a countermeasure to the Iranian-backed Houthi forces.
The Houthis and other terrorist elements
The Houthis, meanwhile, continue to fight for a political system rooted in their interpretation of Zaydi Shia Islam. They view the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in 2015 and its unofficial continuation as an infringement on their sovereignty and have maintained control over northern Yemen with both internal military strength and external support from Iran. Iran’s backing of the Houthis is part of its broader strategy to counterbalance Saudi and UAE influence in the region, particularly to secure strategic access to the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait – key maritime trade routes. This alignment with Iran has positioned the Houthis as one of their key partners in the broader regional power struggle in the Middle East.
Iran’s regional power struggle has made Ansarullah one of its key proxies in the Middle East, acting not only within Yemen but having also expanded their actions across the Red Sea.
In addition, extremist groups like AQAP and ISIS have exploited the chaos of the war to establish footholds in Yemen’s southeastern and eastern regions. AQAP, in particular, has been a significant player, conducting attacks on both Hadi’s forces and Houthi positions. ISIS, though a smaller force, has similarly sought territorial control and the promotion of its radical agenda to establish an Islamic State. Both groups, while competing with the other factions, have capitalized on the conflict’s instability to maintain their presence.
Tribal Militia
Tribal militias, which have long been an integral part of Yemen’s political landscape, further complicate the situation. Tribal dynamics in Yemen are fluid, with militias shifting allegiances based on local interests, often aligning with larger factions like the government or the Houthis, or remaining neutral. These militias have been involved in localized conflicts, exacerbating the fragmentation of the political and military environment. The tribes’ role as intermediaries between the population and larger factions continues to influence the broader conflict, adding another layer of complexity to an already fragmented situation.
Outlook and Policy Implications
The future of the Yemeni conflict remains highly uncertain. One potential outcome is a fragile peace agreement facilitated by UN-led negotiations or regional diplomacy, particularly by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). For this to materialize, key factions – such as the Houthis, the PLC, the STC, and Islah – would need to negotiate a political compromise, likely involving a power-sharing arrangement and a phased reintegration of the South, accompanied by decentralization. However, the entrenched mistrust among these factions, coupled with the broader geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, makes such an agreement unlikely. Additionally, Saudi Arabia and the UAE would need to pivot from pursuing military victory to endorsing a negotiated peace.
Another potential outcome is the secession of southern Yemen, where the STC, supported by the UAE, could push for independence. For this to occur, the STC would need to garner both domestic and international support, as well as military resources to defend its territorial integrity. However, Saudi Arabia would likely resist such a move, given its strategic interests in maintaining Yemen’s unity. Any push for southern independence would likely provoke strong Saudi opposition, leading to further fragmentation and deepening the humanitarian crisis.
In a more extreme scenario, the Houthis could expand their control over all of Yemen through military conquest. This would further solidify Iran’s influence, particularly over key maritime routes. For this to happen, the Houthis would need to maintain their military momentum while the Saudi-led coalition either scales back its involvement or fails to secure a decisive victory. However, given the ongoing challenges faced by Iran due to the war in the Gaza Strip, continued support for the Houthis is unlikely to be sustained, making this scenario less probable.
The most realistic scenario remains a continued military stalemate, with neither side able to secure a decisive victory. This prolonged conflict would perpetuate the humanitarian crisis, with no clear path to peace in sight. The involvement of extremist groups, such as AQAP and ISIS, would further destabilize the region, complicating efforts for military resolution.
For any of these scenarios to pave the way toward a sustainable peace, limiting the flow of weapons into Yemen is crucial. The ongoing supply of arms to various factions, particularly through Saudi Arabia, exacerbates the conflict. For instance, German arms sent to Saudi Arabia have been used in the conflict, indirectly fueling the violence. To facilitate peace, international actors, including Germany, must take a more active role in restricting arms supplies. Limiting military capabilities would pressure the warring factions to consider diplomatic solutions over military escalation.
Lina Abraham joined Polis180 in early 2023. She actively contributes to “Gender & International Politics” and co-leads a blog series on “Peace & Conflict”. Lina studied law, sociology, and political science in Heidelberg and Paris and is now pursuing a Master’s in Conflict Studies in London. She also works as a conflict researcher focusing on the Arabian Peninsula.
The Polis Blog serves as a platform at the disposal of ‘Polis180’s & ‘OpenTTN‘s members. Published comments express solely the ‘authors’ opinions and shall not be confounded with the opinions of the editors or of Polis180.
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