

Feminist Foreign Policy at Risk? What are the Cases of Sweden and Germany Able to Teach Us and Where to Go from Here

by Lena Wittenfeld and Lara Franken

ABSTRACT

As the last few weeks have shown, Germany will suffer the same fate as Sweden - the abolition of a feminist approach to foreign policy. What can Germany learn and take away from the Swedish case? Will feminist foreign policy (FFP) disappear completely if it no longer exists in name? And how can its resilience - understood as its ability to withstand changes of government, anti-democratic forces and other antagonistic forces - be strengthened?

To answer these questions, Lara Franken and Lena Wittenfeld analyse Sweden's experience with the abolition of FFP, and draw parallels to the current political developments in Germany. The authors then outline strategies and instruments to strengthen FFP's resilience.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Wie in den letzten Wochen deutlich geworden ist, ereilt Deutschland das gleiche Schicksal wie Schweden - die Abschaffung des feministischen außenpolitischen Ansatzes. Was kann die Zivilgesellschaft aus dem Deutschen und dem Schwedischen Fall lernen und mitnehmen? Verschwindet die feministische Außenpolitik (FAP) gänzlich, wenn sie namentlich nicht mehr existiert? Wie kann die Resilienz (als Widerstandsfähigkeit) einer FAP erhöht werden, z.B. gegen Regierungswechsel, antidemokratische Kräfte und weitere antagonistische Einflüsse?

Lara Franken und Lena Wittenfeld gehen diesen Fragen nach, indem sie zunächst die Erfahrungen Schwedens mit der Abschaffung ihrer FAP analysieren und Parallelen zur aktuellen politischen Entwicklung in Deutschland ziehen. Anschließend werden Strategien und Instrumente skizziert, welche die Widerstandsfähigkeit einer FAP stärken könnten.

More than 10 years ago, in 2014, Sweden adopted a feminist approach to its foreign policy. Sweden's case is not only a success story, providing a role model for other states to follow, but also shows the fragility and political situatedness of feminist foreign policy (FFP). After a change of government in 2022, Sweden's new, conservative government ended FFP. [Tobias Billström](#), foreign minister of Sweden's new, conservative government coalition, has announced that "Vi kommer inte att använda oss av begreppet feministisk utrikespolitik." ["We will no longer use the term FFP." LW]. Billström further states the usage of the term FFP has led to the label obscuring the content of the policy. However, Billström clarifies that gender equality has always been and will also be a fundamental value of Swedish politics. Even though various actors, activist groups and NGOs have criticised Sweden's withdrawal from a FFP approach, [some observers comment](#) that "Sweden's reversal, however, is less a rebuke of the feminist foreign policy movement's goals or strategy than it is a reflection of the country's current political dynamics."

Two years after Sweden's withdrawal from its FFP approach, Germany is confronted with a comparable situation. Several state elections (e.g. in Thuringia) as well as the results of the national

parliamentary elections in February 2025 indicate that conservative, centre-right parties will not only come to power but will also increase their influence - on the national level in form of a 'Große Koalition' (grand coalition), containing of *CDU/CSU* (fraction of the conservative Christian Democratic party and the conservative Christian-Social Union) and *SPD* (Social Democratic party). Mirroring Sweden's change of government, the new, conservative government is likely to replicate what happened to FFP in Sweden. This concern has been reinforced by public remarks from Johann Wadephul (*CDU*), who is currently expected to become Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs in a potential Merz cabinet. He stated that [he does not intend to continue the FFP](#) of his predecessor Annalena Baerbock (*Greens*). While he expressed openness to discussing women's roles in foreign policy and diplomatic appointments, he made clear that his priorities will lie elsewhere - namely, in addressing major geopolitical crises such as the war in Ukraine, developments in the Middle East, and tensions with Iran. Moreover, feminist foreign policy is not mentioned in the [coalition agreement](#) of the 21st legislative period, reinforcing concerns about its possible discontinuation.

Against this backdrop, we aim to shed light on Sweden's experiences and offer insights into the implications of the potential removal of *feminism* from Germany's foreign policy approach. While this policy brief is not directed solely at any specific administration, it foremostly aims to offer insights to relevant stakeholders in foreign policy and civil society. Our intention is to contribute to the broader debate on how to make FFP more resilient to political change. We further discuss to what extent (formally) abandoning FFP also leads to its impacts and effects being undone. While this question also implicitly addresses the extent to which FFP's impacts and effects may persist even after its formal abolition, we focus on the more abstract need of resilience to strengthen FFP as a progressive and necessary practice. Drawing from the Swedish case, we then seek to develop initial ideas and thoughts to safeguard feminist principles in foreign policy across electoral cycles and (party) ideological divides. Thereby, we hope to initiate further debates and exchange among civil society actors and stakeholders. Furthermore, these reflections may also be of interest to other FFP states in the future so that their fate does not reflect that of Sweden or Germany.

EXPERIENCES AND LEARNINGS FROM THE SWEDISH CASE

In their study, ["Can a Feminist Foreign Policy Be Undone?"](#), Towns et al. examined the implications of the retraction of Sweden's FFP. They found that although the new government has reduced emphasis on gender equality, existing governance frameworks within international treaties and soft law continue to play a vital role. Furthermore, the decentralised nature of foreign policy implementation means that diplomats and officials across the globe retain a certain degree of agency. They are able to emphasise gender equality in their work abroad, even in the absence of strong political directives from the central government. This diffusion of agency makes it difficult to fully retract a FFP once it has been set in motion (but, on a side note, also to track the particular implementation of FFP's objectives). Additionally, Sweden's FFP has inspired other nations to adopt similar policies – like Germany – sharing their normative ambition and adapting Sweden's approach to their foreign policy. For instance, Sweden's 3(+1) 'Rs' approach (rights, representation, resources (+ research)) was mirrored to different extents and in different forms by other state's FFPs. Moreover, and while [an agreed-upon definition of FFP does not exist](#), Sweden's 3 R's approach is often

cited as a coining example concerning the practice of FFP and hence does shape the way in which FFP is understood and defined.

On the global level, the formation of the (UN) [Feminist Foreign Policy Plus \(FFP+\) group](#) and Sweden's work at the UN and other international institutions illustrate Sweden's ongoing influence beyond the original framework established in 2014 and beyond its national policy. Consequently, Sweden's FFP was characterised by its novelty as well as by its ambition marked by the feminist terminology and the inclusion of the '[f-word](#)'. Also, and as the study concludes, "gender equality activities increased markedly during the FFP years", even though the degree of implementation varies significantly. However, other cases like [Norway](#) indicate that an (institutional) anchoring and enforcement of FFP's objectives might not be dependent on the feminist terminology.

But the Swedish case also illustrates how FFP and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda were actively sidelined during Sweden's NATO accession process. As [Wright and Bergman Rosamond](#) show in their analysis, references to WPS in NATO's strategic communication about Sweden dropped significantly after February 2022. Prior to this, Sweden had

positioned itself as a key advocate for WPS within NATO, hosting the [Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations](#) and influencing NATO's gender policies in providing the first gender adviser to NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). However, as Sweden shifted its strategic narrative towards military security and alliance-building, feminist perspectives largely disappeared from diplomatic statements, official visits, and policy discussions. This demonstrates how militarization and security concerns can lead to the silencing of gender equality commitments, even in states that had previously championed them. Moreover, while [Margot Wallström](#) categorically dismissed the prospect of a NATO membership for Sweden - not only but also referring to Sweden's FFP - stances changed in 2022 further underlying the outlined shift back to more traditional understandings of foreign policy.

What can we take away from the Swedish case? While Sweden's FFP approach did not lead to an equal and even implementation of feminist approaches and gender equality across all of Sweden's agencies, embassies and similar, it did increase gender equality work overarchingly as well as more specifically in different dimensions. The effects cannot be easily erased or reversed by taking away the

'feminist' label, though the ambition and general direction, which the feminist terminology entails, impacts how foreign policy is done post-2022. However, the Swedish case also shows that such impact can be fragmented: for instance, [Sweden's prior contributions to NATO's WPS agenda](#) - including hosting NATO's gender training hub and evaluating WPS implementation - left an institutional footprint. Yet these very constitutions were not mobilised during the accession process, neither as part of Sweden's strategic self-presentation nor in NATO's communications. Wright and Bergman Rosamond even argue that FFP has been "a threat to [Sweden's] quest for NATO membership". This paradox - visible institutional impact, but narrative erasure - demonstrates how FFP gains can be both durable and vulnerable at once. For other governments that currently implement an FFP or are planning to do so, this underscores the importance of integrating gender equality not just into policy structures, but also into the core strategic narratives and practices that shape foreign policy.

Prior to proposing possible strategies and instruments to enhance the resilience of FFP, we need to take a closer look at the German case in order to understand its particularities and to evaluate where it

differs from the Swedish case and where we can observe similar notions.

GERMANY ON THE VERGE OF LOSING ITS FFP

As in the Swedish case, Germany's approach to FFP largely depends on the commitment of a single political party, with little cross-party support - a factor that, as outlined below, is crucial for ensuring sustainable implementation. In 2019, *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* (The Greens) advocated for the introduction of a feminist foreign policy to the then-coalition government formed by the *SPD* and *CDU/CSU*; however, the proposal was met with unanimous rejection from all other fractions in the [German Bundestag](#). The following year, *Die Linke* (The Left) submitted a similar proposal, but it also did not gain the necessary support. The *AfD* (the far-right *Alternative for Germany* party) faction on the other hand introduced a motion explicitly rejecting the implementation of a FFP in 2020. This political trajectory, examined by [Stamm](#) in her 2024 contribution on FFP in Germany, underscores the limited institutional anchoring of the concept in parliamentary procedures. In 2021, with the formation of the coalition government between *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*, *SPD*, and *FDP* (the liberal

Free Democratic party), *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* successfully integrated their vision of FFP into the [coalition agreement](#). This positioned Germany among a growing number of states adopting similar feminist approaches to foreign policy. Nonetheless, there were discussions within the 2021 government regarding the terminology, as the *FDP*'s [reluctance](#) to use the German term “feministische Außenpolitik” resulted in the coalition agreement including only the English translation “Feminist Foreign Policy”.

A study from the [PRIF \(2021\)](#) indicates that only *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* and *Die Linke* regard an FFP as an essential component of Germany's foreign policy agenda. While the *FDP* and *SPD* do not explicitly endorse an FFP, they nonetheless acknowledge the importance of integrating gender considerations into their approaches. The *SPD*, in particular, included a strong reference to international frameworks aimed at strengthening gender equality in their election programme in 2021, signalling that feminist ideas should continue to have a place within foreign policy. For parties such as the *CDU/CSU* and *AfD* a FFP plays no role in their foreign policy objectives. Taking a look at the [results of the national parliamentary elections](#) from February 2025, it becomes clear why this analysis of

parties' stance towards FFP matters. *CDU/CSU* is in the lead (28,6%), followed by the far-right party *AfD* (20,8%). The *SPD*, previously the strongest party in the former government, received 16,4% of the vote, while *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* followed as the fourth strongest party (11,6%). A coalition between *CDU/CSU* and *SPD* has been agreed upon and the parties [have successfully concluded their coalition talks](#). So, [will the new government drop FFP?](#) The outlook for FFP is darkened by the collapse of the previous governing coalition between *SPD*, *Bündnis90/Die Grünen* and *FDP*, and by the fact that *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*, its prime supporter, is not part of the next government. As a result and as the [coalition agreement](#) makes clear, the prospects of advancing a FFP are increasingly bleak and Germany will quite certainly follow Sweden in abandoning its FFP subsequent to the [new government's officially take over in May](#) and the above mentioned statement of Germany's new Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Waidephul. However, the final decision of FFP's continued existence [depends largely on the ministries involved](#), and their will to maintain the implementation of at least part of their strategies.

Sweden's FFP stood out for its strong institutional framework, with integration

across multiple organisational units and objectives - an aspect highlighted by [Zilla](#) in her analysis of FFP approaches. Unlike Sweden's single-ministry model, Germany's FFP is embedded across two ministries - the Federal Foreign Office (AA) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) - both of which published their own strategies within a short period of time in March 2023. In Germany, foreign - and development policy are the responsibility of two different ministries, each led by a different political party. Because these ministries have their own political priorities, ways of working, and institutional backgrounds, there is no unified or coherent approach to FFP. Instead, each ministry has developed its own strategy and implements FFP based on its specific mandate and goals. Moreover, the AA's guidelines include the call for a 'feminist reflex' that partly mirrors what [Towns et al.](#) identify as the broad implementation throughout multiple dimensions and foreign policy areas in Sweden's FFP. The 'feminist reflex' is a tool that focuses on internal ministerial work. As outlined in the [AA's guidelines on FFP](#), these principles are meant to shape internal practices and foster a working culture that embodies a feminist approach rather than understanding feminist practices as 'add-ons'. The feminist

reflex hence refers to a kind of automatism inherent to ministerial practices and foreign policy activities. However, research on the feminist reflex is still at the beginning and questions concerning the degree of institutionalisation of FFP in the German ministries are still unanswered. Hence, an evaluation of the German FFP's resilience is mostly based on interpretation and critical observations from our civil society perspective.

As shown above, [Sweden's 3 R's approach](#) can also be found in the German [AA's guidelines on FFP](#) and the [BMZ's Feminist Development Strategies](#). [Recent analyses](#) highlight, however, that alignment between the ministries has not yet materialised. While the AA had initially introduced and implemented a "3R+D" framework that included diversity, the 'D' for diversity has since been dismissed. Further, the BMZ has not incorporated this element or advocate explicitly for the inclusion of diverse groups of people. The absence of an integrated cross-ministerial strategy and misalignment between key policy documents present significant challenges for coherence and coordination between the AA and the BMZ and ultimately undermine the effective implementation of a unified feminist agenda. This disconnection may [result in inconsistencies](#), particularly in foreign policy

decisions that require collaboration among various ministries. Moreover, this lack of coherence further hinders a firm institutional and firm implementation that may extend beyond a single legislative period and that will continue to exist despite changes in government and the composition of governing coalitions.

Notwithstanding the commitments that have been articulated, the institutionalisation of Germany's FFP remains largely inconsistent and is coined by FFP's instrumentalization for certain purposes and interests. Although the policy is briefly mentioned in key documents such as the cross-departmental [national security strategy](#), it is not yet firmly embedded in Germany's broader security and foreign policy frameworks. While the national security strategy explicitly refers to FFP and its three main pillars (3 'R's), feminist norms and goals remain largely absent. Foremost, FFP's objectives have become visible in the strategy's understanding of security that goes beyond a traditional and narrow definition of security as state security. Nevertheless, the state is still the centre of attention - as visible in the outlined three dimensions of security (protection from war and violence, protection of democratic freedom, and economic security), human rights are frequently mentioned hinting at a human

security approach. We can observe neither a structural, overarching, and coherent implementation of FFP nor a genuine shift towards a foreign policy that is based on feminist principles. FFP is rather mentioned as an add-on and only if convenient - as also stated by [Ehlert/Schaefer-Kehnert](#): "Germany's current approach to security sector reform is not compatible with the principles of a feminist foreign policy. To change that, the government must truly commit to human security and apply an intersectional lens".

Furthermore, the [discourse on FFP in Germany](#) appears to be detached from overarching political decision-making. This separation is especially noticeable with regard to key matters like diplomatic relations with specific countries and decisions related to military and political interventions in critical conflicts, such as Germany's continued arms exports to Saudi Arabia, the strategic partnership with Turkey despite increasing authoritarianism and human rights violations, or the government's hesitation to apply a feminist lens in its support of Ukraine. Moreover, FFP only works as a [comprehensive](#) and overarching approach, as Domres and Wittenfeld argue: "The potency of FFP lies in its permeation of every facet of foreign relations. It must transcend the boundaries of gender equality within

isolated ministries to unlock its full transformative potential". While Germany has two ministries involved in its feminist approach, other important policy fields as well as domestic politics are left out. Therefore, feminist interventions are reduced to a specific policy field while their implementation is only comprehensive and effective if applied broadly and fundamentally.

Another factor contributing to the diminishing influence of Germany's FFP is the growing accusations of double standards, which are undermining the country's credibility among international partners and civil society actors. This is particularly evident in the German government's decision to approve large-scale arms exports to Saudi Arabia in 2023, despite the weapons export embargo outlined in the [2021 coalition agreement](#), which prohibits arms sales to countries involved in the war in Yemen. Another example of these contradictions is Germany's arms exports to Israel amid the [ongoing possible genocide in Gaza](#). While Germany is one of the largest donors of humanitarian aid to Gaza, it continues to supply arms to Israel and abstained from UN votes calling for an immediate ceasefire in October and December 2023. [Mittelhammer et al.](#) argue that this dissonance between Germany's humanitarian aid efforts and its continued

arms exports reveals a profound inconsistency in the country's foreign policy. They stress that Germany's historical responsibility demands a foreign policy that consistently prioritises human security in an inclusive and comprehensive manner. For a FFP to be credible, Germany must address these contradictions directly. The German government's decision to [allocate €100 billion to the Bundeswehr](#) in 2022 as part of its so-called *Zeitenwende* represents another contradiction in its FFP. [Menninger from Women's International League for Peace and Freedom \(WILPF\)](#) highlights that the investment is framed as a necessary response to security challenges but primarily reflects a shift towards militarisation rather than a commitment to feminist security principles. She argues that increasing military spending without proportionate investments in civilian crisis prevention and diplomatic initiatives undermines the transformative goals of FFP. This trend has recently been reinforced through a [parliamentary decision in March 2025](#) to amend the German constitution (Grundgesetz) in order to allow for historically high levels of debt-financed spending. The decision, which passed with a two-thirds majority, lifts the debt brake for defence and security expenditures exceeding 1% of GDP. While it also includes infrastructure and climate-

related investments, the prioritisation of military funding without a similar commitment to feminist peacebuilding strategies raises questions about the coherence and integrity of Germany's FFP.

HOW TO MAKE FFP MORE RESILIENT? WHAT'S NEXT FOR GERMANY AND FFP?

The civil society organisation *Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation* has examined [factors](#) that would facilitate the sustainable implementation of a FFP. In this context, the organisation identifies seven key factors:

- cross-party consolidation and parliamentary support,
- present clear and concrete results of FFP implementation,
- clearly define a level of ambition that is ambitious but doable,
- invest in public awareness,
- separate action plans from the label,
- be mindful of the FFP becoming too person-driven,
- and international cooperation.

These factors underscore the importance of strategic planning and collaboration in sustaining FFPs. In the German context, we direct our initial recommendations at those involved in drafting, implementing, enforcing, advocating for, and critically examining FFP, including government

officials, civil society actors and stakeholders who lobby for a sustainable and comprehensive FFP approach. We thereby seek to offer helpful advice and support for advocacy work for a sustainable and comprehensive FFP approach. Although recent developments clearly suggest that the current form and label of FFP may not be upheld, we argue that the principles and objectives associated with FFP must not be abandoned. While it would be highly desirable for a FFP to remain visible and explicitly named - as political labels often shape whether and how policies are implemented - many of its core elements can and should continue to guide foreign policy making even without the explicit use of the term. Drawing on the seven factors outlined by the *Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation*, we propose six measures to strengthen FFP's resilience:

1. To enhance Germany's feminist approach, a **more cohesive strategy** is crucial, as FFP presents a coherent and holistic policy approach. This would include aligning feminist foreign and development policies across key ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Environment. Ensuring consistent principles between the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

would minimise contradictions and amplify policy impact - a point also emphasised in the ten recommendations for Germany's feminist development policy proposed by [IDOS](#) in 2022.

2. **Feminist funding** is crucial in empowering marginalised groups, supporting inclusive, long-term processes, and addressing systemic inequalities, all of which are fundamental to realising genuine gender justice. This has also been stressed by [Mukalazi](#) in her reflection on feminist development and foreign policy as tools for redistributing public resources to grassroots movements, particularly those led by marginalised communities. As noted by the [Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy](#), although Germany's pledge to allocate 85% of project funds to gender-sensitive and 8% to gender-transformative initiatives by 2025 is a positive move, more direct support for feminist organisations is needed. Between 2014 and 2020, these groups received only 0.4% of Germany's gender-focused aid. In addition, the provided resources must be allocated in a way that meets local requirements and in close collaboration with local partners on eye-level.

3. The **diversification of decision-making and advisory bodies** could potentially lead to broader support for Germany's FFP as well as to decisions that reflect the needs and experiences of marginalized groups and individuals as well as of various actors, including, for instance (critical) civil society or NGOs locally and globally. [Stengel and Wibben](#) argue that such diversification must go beyond surface-level inclusion. Without critically reassessing institutional norms and power structures, FFP is at risk of falling into an 'add-and-stir' logic, meaning the adding of certain actors on the basis of, for example, quota, without questioning the institutional foundations and underlying discriminatory systems. Consequently, the diversification of representation across various contexts and bodies must include a re-evaluation and transformation of the very institutions themselves to enable and facilitate inclusive dialogues and institutions that engage in debate at eye-level.
4. The significance of **effective communication** cannot be overstated. FFP and its objectives are [widely unknown in the German population](#). Therefore, it is vital that the concept is communicated in such a manner as to be

comprehensible and accessible to a wider audience. To raise public awareness, FFP and the related institutions must invest in public communication and a communication strategy as a fixed component of their work. Communication should, however, entail precise and clear descriptions and examples to make FFP accessible without losing its critical and transformative character. Thereby, FFP becomes not only more understandable but also less of an abstraction.

5. FFP should not be reduced to self-congratulatory declarations but must prove its value through **practical application in responding to crises and promoting human security**. This requires expanding and deepening global alliances such as the FFP+ group into meaningful partnerships that move beyond symbolic politics and are rooted in trust, empathy, and solidarity. As a tool for collective action in global crises and as a critical voice, FFP must deliver concrete results while defining a level of ambition that is both bold and achievable – at the national and international level, as also emphasised by [Leonie Stamm](#).

6. To ensure its continuity and effectiveness, **FFP should be anchored in broad-based alliances** across politics and civil society, **rather than being tied to individual leadership figures**. While [Margot Wallström](#) played a significant role in advancing FFP in Sweden, Germany exemplifies this trend through Annalena Baerbock's association with its FFP. It is notable that [women are often linked to FFP](#) and have held leadership positions in relevant ministries at the time of its institutionalisation. However, a major concern is that FFP becomes too person-driven and overly reliant on one person's motivation and engagement. As a result, there is a tangible danger that FFP may be abandoned once these key figures leave office. Building cross-party consensus and a sustainable institutional framework is therefore essential to embed gender equality principles meaningfully and long-term in foreign policy.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

While the political momentum behind FFP appears to be waning in some contexts, including Germany, our analysis shows that its core principles remain vital for shaping equitable and sustainable international engagement. Recognising that

an explicit commitment to FFP may not be politically viable, we identify strategic pathways to preserve and advance these principles in practice - even in the absence of the label “feminist foreign policy”. These include gender equality, the protection and promotion of human rights, meaningful participation of marginalised groups, and a commitment to peace and intersectional justice. These guiding principles must remain central to Germany’s international engagement as the abolishment of a feminist approach would [“mean moving away from a commitment to social transformation”](#) and an equal and just future. For Germany’s FFP - and state FFPs in general - to remain credible, effective and impactful, its feminist approach must be institutionally embedded to ensure long-term continuity across changing political landscapes. Without a strong institutional foundation, foreign policy shifts risk sidelining feminist principles, as evident in Sweden’s NATO accession process. Additionally, securing cross-party support and ensuring coherence across ministries would prevent inconsistencies and strengthen the transformative potential of FFP. Furthermore, Germany’s FFP approach remains highly dependent on the ambition of individual parties and individual politicians, such as Foreign Minister

Annalena Baerbock. Further work on and advocacy for FFP must therefore prioritise a broader, cross-party consensus to create a strong, sustainable institutional framework for FFP, while avoiding terminological ambiguities and ensuring that gender equality principles are genuinely reflected in all aspects of foreign policy.

Public awareness and effective communication must also be prioritised to make FFP more accessible and prevent it from being perceived as an abstract concept. Moreover, feminist funding, especially for civil society organisations, is crucial for advancing gender justice, strengthening marginalised voices, and fostering sustainable change. Ensuring that financial resources and funding reaches feminist grassroots movements and local actors would enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of FFP. Finally, international co-operation, particularly through initiatives such as the FFP+ group, should be expanded to promote a more resilient and collective feminist approach to global crises.

The recommendations outlined by *Kvinna till Kvinna* as well as in our [Polis Paper](#) “Below its Potential - Navigating the Complexity of Feminist Foreign Policy” further emphasise the need for clear and measurable results, realistic yet ambitious

goals, and the translation of rhetorical commitments and promises to concrete and sustainable actions. Germany must move beyond symbolic declarations and ensure that feminist principles are reflected in all aspects of its foreign policy and that FFP, thereby, becomes a coherent approach. Strengthening international

partnerships, maintaining an intersectional approach, and ensuring that FFP does not become dependent on individual political figures will be essential to making FFP a lasting and effective framework.

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